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The Future of the Canadian Energy Industry in a
Low Price Commodity Environment
Monika U. Ehrman*
INTRODUCTION
As wildfires raced across Northern Alberta in May and June 2016,
they consumed over 1,930 square miles—almost the size of the State of
Delaware or the Canadian province of Prince Edward Island—and
displaced over 80,000 residents, mainly in the oilfield town of Fort
McMurray. The City of Fort McMurray, Alberta, was once a small
community known primarily for its rich natural resources, including fish,
rock salt, and timber. In the early 1900s, Canada’s Federal Department of
Mines, in conjunction with the University of Alberta, performed
separation experiments to extract bitumen1 from the oil-rich sands.2
Decades later, in 1967, the Great Canadian Oil Sands—now Suncor—
“proved that bitumen could successfully be removed [from] the oil sand
and upgraded the crude oil on a large scale.”3 The commercialization and
reserve recognition of the oil sands transformed Canada into the sixth
largest oil producer in the world4 and the third largest holder of petroleum
reserves, after Venezuela and Saudi Arabia.5 The massive fires, visible
even in satellite photos, not only endangered lives and personal property,
but also threatened to consume certain oil sands project infrastructure.
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1. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW: MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS
TERMS 234 (2015) (“A naturally occurring viscous mixture, mainly of hydrocarbons
heavier than pentane, that may contain sulphur compounds and that in its naturally
occurring viscous state is not recoverable at a commercial rate through a well.”).
2. FORT MCMURRAY TOURISM, History, fortmcmurraytourism.com/explorewood-buffalo/history [https://perma.cc/XAH3-AYTN] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
3. Id.
4. CNNMONEY, World’s Top Oil Producers, money.cnn.com/interactive/news
/economy/worlds-biggest-oil-producers/ [https://perma.cc/MRU6-M87J] (last visited
Feb. 22, 2017).
5. ALBERTA ENERGY, Facts and Statistics, energy.alberta.ca/oilsands/791.asp
(last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
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Ultimately, these fires caused the shutdown of eleven oil sands plants—
1.2 million barrels of oil a day were taken off-line.6
The wildfires could not have occurred at a worse time in Alberta.
Commodity price volatility in the period following 2014, when West
Texas Intermediate peaked at over $103 per barrel, was apparent in its
subsequent plummet to $30 per barrel by February 2016.7 Although crude
oil prices have increased slightly since then, they recently closed around
the meager price of $44 per barrel in August 2016.8 Natural gas prices,
too, have fallen since 2014, closing under $3 per mmBtu in August 2016
from a high of $6 per mmBtu in February 2014.9 This significant decrease
in commodity price has caused turmoil in the Canadian energy industry; it
is especially prevalent in the exploration and production (upstream) sector,
which is more sensitive to negative price fluctuations than the cost-ofservice midstream and downstream refining sectors. In fact, the steep
decline in prices since 2014 likely caused a $50 billion drop in capital
spending—“the largest two-year decline since the Canadian Association
of Petroleum Producers . . . and its predecessor organizations started
tracking this data in 1947 . . . .”10 Other tangible effects on the energy
industry sector include the loss of 110,000 jobs (including indirect jobs)
and a decrease in Canadian government revenues from royalties and tax
payments.11
The recent downturn in commodity prices is having a major impact on
American and Canadian energy sectors as a whole. In the U.S., “[ninety
exploration and production] companies have filed for Chapter 11
protection since the beginning of 2015[,]” with a combined defaulted debt
of $66.5 billion ($26.5 billion in secured debt and $40.0 billion in

6. Brent Jang, 14 Million Barrels or About $760 Million, The Globe and Mail,
May 12, 2016, theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-andresources/estimated-oil-sands-losses-could-top-760-million-from-wildfireshutdown
/article29984575/ [https://perma.cc/DEG9-XF5C].
7. U.S. E NERGY I NFO . A DMIN ., Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB,
eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=M [https://perma.cc
/7WVB-C8QZ] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
8. Id.
9. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price,
eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdM.htm [https://perma.cc/9SN8-RBV9] (last visited
Feb. 22, 2017).
10. Press Release, Canadian Ass’n of Petroleum Producers, Capital Investment
in Canada’s Oil and Gas Industry Down 62% in 2 Years (Apr. 7, 2016), capp.ca/media
/news-releases/capital-investment-in-canada-oil-and-gas-industry-down-62-per-centin-2-years [https://perma.cc/82U7-P8GC] [hereinafter Canadian Ass’n of Petroleum
Producers Press Release].
11. Id. Indirect employment effects may arise from transactions done by those
directly employed in the oil and gas sector (e.g., drilling, extraction, support).
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unsecured debt).12 Further, though merger and acquisition (M&A) activity
is expected to rise in the near-term, estimates show that at least 135
exploration and production companies—including “Comstock Resources
with a debt load of $1.2 billion, W&T Offshore with debts of $1.4 billion,
EXCO Resources, which owes its creditors $1.2 billion, and Chesapeake
Energy with $14 billion outstanding”—“are at a high risk of going
under.”13 The short-term price outlook for crude oil and natural gas
appears grim, and many publicly traded U.S. companies have relegated
future development planning to price forecasts in the mid-$60s. Low
commodity prices may be here to stay for quite some time.
However, as morose as the future appears for American businesses, it
is far worse for Canadian exploration and production companies. Its first
major challenge is that the Canadian hydrocarbon basin is heavily
comprised of natural gas, which trades at multiples lower than crude oil.
Its second major challenge is that the Canadian energy sector relies heavily
upon exports to the U.S., primarily, and other countries for sale of same.
In 2015, over 40% of Canadian energy production was sent to the U.S.14
Accordingly, any change in U.S. energy supply–demand metrics
correlates with an associated change in Canadian energy exports. For
example, Canadian natural gas imports, primarily utilized for electric
power generation, have been replaced with domestic U.S. natural gas
production, which has increased after the advent and wide-scale use of
hydraulic fracturing. Additionally, the economic deflation and contraction
of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, in addition to Japan and other liquefied
natural gas (LNG) importers, have also resulted in decreased Canadian
energy exports. Finally, changes in provincial and federal governments
have resulted in administrations that do not favor hydrocarbon investment.
This article, adapted from the LSU Law Center symposium, Emerging
Issues at the Intersection of Energy and Natural Resources (March 4,
2016),15 reviews, in brief, the decline in petroleum commodity prices; the
magnitude and importance of the Canadian exploration and production
sector (with particular attention given to its relationship with the U.S.); the
12. OIL & GAS 360, Haynes and Boone Releases Latest Edition of Bankruptcy
Monitor (Aug. 5, 2016), oilandgas360.com/haynes-boone-releases-latest-editionbankruptcy-monitor/ [https://perma.cc/H9BR-PQ3Q].
13. Irina Slav, Why the Bankruptcy Wave in Oil & Gas Isn’t Over Yet,
OILPRICE.COM (Sept. 15, 2016), oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Why-TheBankruptcy-Wave-In-Oil-Gas-Isnt-Over-Yet.html [https://perma.cc/N98T-B4J2].
14. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Frequently Asked Questions: How much
petroleum does the United States import and export?, eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id
=727&t=6 [https://perma.cc/854M-2YV8] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
15. Cosponsored by the John B. Laborde Energy Law Center, the Journal of
Energy Law and Resources, the LSU School of the Coast and Environment, and
Campanile Charities.
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effects of the drop in commodity prices and the resultant challenges faced
by the Canadian energy industry; and possible strategies for Canada to
weather the decline and improve its resistance to future price volatility.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION
SECTOR AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES
Oil and gas makes up 10.6% of Canadian Gross Domestic Product.16
97% of Canadian crude oil exports flow to the U.S., while 100% of
Canadian natural gas exports flow to its southerly neighbor.17 These
exports total $146 billion.18 Additionally, revenues from energy industries
include corporate income taxes levied on companies operating in Canada;
indirect taxes (sales and payroll); Crown royalties, which are made up of
“the share of the value of the oil and gas extracted that is paid to the Crown
as the resource owner[;]” and “Crown land sales, which are paid to the
Crown in order to acquire the resource rights for specific properties.”19
The Canadian oil and gas industry provided $20.3 billion over the last five
years.20
For decades, Canada has been the largest energy exporter to the U.S.,
which imports 39% of its crude oil and 98% of its natural gas from
Canada.21 These countries enjoy a close, relatively unprotected border, and
share a comfortable political relationship. Their geographical proximity,
which offers relative ease in developing energy exporting infrastructure,
such as pipelines, rail, and trucks, is a determinative factor in Canada’s
energy export advantage. The advent of the shale revolution heralded a
paradigm shift in global energy policy and geopolitics. Long an importer
of petroleum, the U.S. relied on the whim of the Organization for
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the global oil cartel, to set the
global commodity price of crude oil. However, George Mitchell’s
groundbreaking research using a combination of hydraulic fracturing and
horizontal drilling unlocked monumental, previously unrecoverable

16. NATURAL RESOURCES CANADA, ENERGY FACT BOOK 2015–2016 4 (using
2014 numbers and including direct and indirect contributions; stating that “[o]il and
gas includes oil and gas extraction, support activities for oil and gas extraction, natural
gas distribution, petroleum refineries, and pipeline transportation.”) [hereinafter
ENERGY FACT BOOK].
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id. (using 2014 numbers).
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 5.
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reserves and unleashed the potential for U.S. energy independence22—
vindicating President Richard Nixon and his vision for the same.23
Canada also benefited from this monumental hydrocarbon technology
advance, utilizing the process in the giant Western Canadian Sedimentary
Basin and Alberta and British Columbia shale plays, such as the
Montney.24 Production in the northern Alberta oil sands also increased, as
did the related foreign acquisitions of Canadian energy companies—led,
in part, by China, which seeks to secure energy supplies throughout the
world. As a result, Chinese companies have acquired many companies and
interests as they look to establish a strong presence in resource-rich
Canada.25 Unlike the U.S., which has been less than hospitable to Chinese
M&A overtures, Canada’s open economy has embraced these deals.
Between 2010 and 2013, Chinese companies made significant acquisitions
in Canada including Sinopec’s acquisition of ConocoPhillips Company’s
9.03% stake in Syncrude Canada and China National Offshore Oil
Corporation Ltd.’s acquisition of Nexen.26 Other major acquisitions
included the purchase of Talisman Energy by Spain’s Repsol, valued at
$8.3 billion (USD), and Malaysian national oil company, PETRONAS,
acquiring Progress Energy Resources Corp. for $6 billion.27
Canadian M&A activity peaked along with crude oil prices in 2014.
And though the subsequent price decline was unwelcome, it certainly was
not unexpected to those familiar with the turbulence of the petroleum
economy. However, what most surprised energy analysts and industry
officials was OPEC’s apparent refusal, or inability, to curtail its members’
production. Energy observers hypothesized that OPEC, disgruntled over
the American impact of shale oil production, decided to defend its market
position.28 After all, in 2014 the U.S. surpassed Saudi Arabia to become
22. See Trent Jacobs, Shale Revolution Revisits the Energized Fracture, J.
PETROLEUM TECH., June 2014.
23. Monika U. Ehrman, The Next Great Compromise: A Comprehensive
Response to Opposition Against Shale Gas Development Using Hydraulic Fracturing
in the United States, 46 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 423, 425 (2014).
24. Jacobs, supra note 22.
25. Omar Mawji, China Ramps Up Predatory Acquisitions in Canadian Oil and
Gas, OILPRICE.COM (Apr. 8, 2016), oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/China-RampsUp-Predatory-Acquisitions-In-Canadian-Oil-Gas.html [https://perma.cc/2A9F
-C7CS].
26. Id.; ENERGY FACT BOOK, supra note 16, at 13.
27. Press Release, Repsol, Repsol Reaches an Agreement with Talisman Energy
to Acquire the Canadian Oil Company (Dec. 16, 2014); ENERGY FACT BOOK, supra
note 16, at 14.
28. Javier Blas & Ryan Chilcote, World’s Largest Energy Trader Sees a Decade
of Low Oil Prices, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2016), bloomberg.com/news/articles/201602-08/world-s-largest-energy-trader-sees-a-decade-of-low-oil-prices [https://perma
.cc/45PT-KCMA].
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the world’s largest producer of petroleum.29 To achieve this stature less
than fifty years after the Arab oil embargo and price shocks is astounding.
The U.S., once so worried about a lack of energy that it permitted the
construction of several LNG import terminals, now exports natural gas and
has become the global swing supplier. Thus, experts surmised that OPEC
desired ridding the American threat and employed the ages old strategy
used by Rockefeller and his fellow Robber Barons—flood the market with
supply, which would result in a corresponding drop in price and outlast the
competition.
II. EFFECTS OF THE COMMODITY PRICE DECLINE AND CHALLENGES TO
THE CANADIAN ECONOMY
Canadian exploration and production companies, like their American
counterparts, initially believed that the decline in commodity prices would be
short-lived, similar to the 2009 mini-bust. Analysts concluded that several
OPEC members could not afford to suffer low crude oil prices for any
significant duration. The budgets for most OPEC members, many of which
are petrostates, are closely tied to revenues averaging $100 or more per barrel
crude oil. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported:
Members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) earned $404 billion in net oil export revenue in 2015,
according to U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
estimates. These earnings represent a 46% decline from $753 billion
earned in 2014. Although these net export earnings include Iran’s
revenues, the net export revenue is not adjusted for possible price
discounts that Iran may have offered its customers between late 2011
and January 2016, when nuclear-related sanctions targeting Iran’s oil
sales were in place . . . . OPEC members’ 2015 net oil export revenue
was at the lowest level since 2004, with significant implications for
the fiscal condition of member countries that rely heavily on oil sales
to fund social programs and to import other goods and services. In
inflation-adjusted terms, OPEC net oil export revenue totaled $606
per person in 2015, down 83% from the 1980 level of $3,500 per
person.30
29. Grant Smith, U.S. Seen as Biggest Oil Producer After Overtaking Saudi,
BLOOMBERG (July 4, 2014), bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-04/u-s-seen-asbiggest-oil-producer-after-overtaking-saudi [https://perma.cc/Z6FU-7HPC].
“Petroleum” includes crude oil, natural gas liquids (NGL), and natural gas.
30. Lejla Villar, OPEC Members’ Net Oil Export Revenue in 2015 Drops to
Lowest Level Since 2004, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 26, 2016), eia.gov
/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27692 [https://perma.cc/3XM7-A4YJ].
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Canadian producers benefitted from the experience of past booms and
were reluctant to take immediate, drastic actions such as project stoppages
or layoffs. These lessons were hard-learned in the 1980s, when mass
layoffs resulted in a “missing generation” of skilled oilfield workers,
including petroleum engineers and geologists.31 However, crude oil prices
remained low through 2015, leaving companies to pursue various
strategies to cut costs. Repsol Oil & Gas, which acquired former Canadian
darling Talisman Energy for $15 billion in late 2014, “cut 10 to 15 per cent
of its Calgary workforce in light of ‘low global energy prices’ and
expected reductions in future activity levels” in 2016.32 Canadian
headquarters of American companies were shuttered. In December 2014,
Houston-based EOG Resources closed its Calgary headquarters and “sold
most of its Western Canadian assets to Calgary energy giant Canadian
Natural Resources Ltd” with a package of southwestern Manitoba assets
going to Winnipeg-based Tundra Oil and Gas Ltd.33 “The remaining
Canadian EOG assets, mainly in the Horn River Basin of northeastern B.C.
but including some Alberta assets being retained because of partner
agreements, are to be managed from the [U.S.].”34 In 2015, “Suncor, the
largest oil sands operator, announced plans to eliminate about 1,000
contract jobs [and] Shell Canada said it would cut its oil sands work force
by about 10[%].”35
Former purchasers also suffered buyer’s remorse as “oil prices fell
from over $100 per barrel in 2014 to $40 per barrel in mid-2016 . . . .”36
Regretting their high-priced purchases, Chinese firms implemented
measures such as “cost cutting, capital postponement, and layoffs to
preserve investments.”37 Further, while those companies have not decided
to abandon Canada, they are “starting to approach oil investment from a
value perspective [ . . . and are] less speculative and more conservative in
31. See Alex Nussbaum & David Wethe, Lost Generation Of Oil Workers Leaves
Few Options For Next Boom, BLOOMBERG (July 7, 2016), rigzone.com/news/oil_gas
/a/145492/Lost_Generation_Of_Oil_Workers_Leaves_Few_Options_For_Next
_Boom [https://perma.cc/9KFF-RR3V].
32. CBC NEWS, Repsol, formerly Talisman Energy, to Cut Up to 15% of its
Calgary Workforce (Mar. 3, 2016), cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/repsol-talisman
-job-cuts-march-2016-1.3474609 [https://perma.cc/X2FG-67P4].
33. Dan Healing, EOG Resources Closing Canadian HQ in Calgary, CALGARY
HERALD, Dec. 8, 2014, calgaryherald.com/business/energy/eog-resources-closingcanadian-hq-in-calgary [https://perma.cc/9Z8L-4YJQ].
34. Id.
35. Ian Austen, Lower Oil Prices Strike at Heart of Canada’s Oil Sands
Production, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2015, nytimes.com/2015/02/03/business/energyenvironment/lower-oil-prices-strike-at-heart-of-oil-sands-production.html [https:
//perma.cc/RFJ4-MCQH].
36. Mawji, supra note 25.
37. Id.
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the price they are willing to pay with the expectation of unlocking
wealth.”38
Projects, current and planned, were also postponed or cancelled. Cenovus
Energy stated it would “reduce investment spending by 27[%], and set aside
plans for two oil sands project expansions.”39 Additionally, many oil sands
projects requiring Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage (SAGD)—the most
common technique for extracting the deepest deposits of oil sands—are now
uneconomic.40 Smaller companies’ SAGD projects, which were approved at
higher commodity prices, are now unworkable in today’s world of $50
crude.41 According to the Bank of Nova Scotia, “[t]he break-even point for a
brand-new SAGD project, including a [nine percent] average return on
investment, requires crude prices of at least $65 a barrel, which is among the
highest extraction cost in the oil industry . . . .”42 Moreover, unlike the typical
conventional well or even unconventional shale well, oil sands operations are
not easily alterable and require a long-term stable price environment to be
economic. These massive projects do not have operational flexibility, forcing
companies to maintain production “to cover the sizable debt on their
multibillion-dollar investments.”43 And halting production has the added
consequence of ceding market share to other global producers.44
The Canadian exploration and production sector also faces several
other major challenges. In particular, Canadian resource basins are
primarily composed of natural gas, where natural gas is trading in lower
multiples than crude oil. Additionally, many Canadian subsidiaries of the
U.S. or other foreign companies must compete with other home or foreign
assets. Tough economic conditions require companies to invest limited
dollars in projects that produce the greatest returns. With above-mentioned
EOG Resources, its divestment decision was “consistent with EOG’s
focus on its outstanding U.S. crude oil opportunities.”45 Canada also faces
an overreliance on the U.S. market, along with those associated crossborder transportation infrastructure challenges such as the failure of the

38. Id.
39. Austen, supra note 35.
40. Chester Dawson, Falling Crude Prices Upend Canada’s Oil Sands Projects,
WALL ST. J., July 22, 2015, wsj.com/articles/falling-crude-prices-upend-canadas-oilsands-projects-1437609134 [https://perma.cc/4Y7G-DUL5].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Austen, supra note 35.
44. Id.
45. Healing, supra note 33 (“‘We plan to reinvest some of the proceeds in these
high-return assets, while retaining our position in the Horn River Basin and other
exploration areas,’ said EOG chairman and CEO Bill Thomas in the release.”).
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Keystone Pipeline, which President Obama announced that he was
rejecting on November 6, 2015.46
The contentious pipeline debate and effective halting of the project did
not better the Canadian energy environment. Rather, stopping the pipeline
removes much needed market liquidity and takeaway capacity options.
The once-reliable Canadian LNG markets faltered as the U.S. and
Australia entered the LNG export arena by building new LNG export
facilities.47
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the Canadian energy sector is the
current political climate. Turnover in both the energy-heavy province of
Alberta and in the Canadian federal government resulted in administrations
that favor environmental progress within the energy sectors. In May 2015,
Albertans voted in a New Democratic Party (NDP) government to succeed
the longstanding Progressive Conservative party. The NDP Leader and now
Premier of Alberta, Rachel Notley, promptly announced her intention to
move Alberta away from hydrocarbons; to impose a hydrocarbon tax
(similar to the one already passed in neighboring British Columbia); and to
declare to American investors that Alberta was not open to petroleum
investment.48 Since those first days, however, Premier Notley appears to
have shifted her ideologies, recently supporting additional oil sands projects,
favorable tax systems, and encouraging private investment. However, she
did temper her speech to the investment community by commenting that
changes to greenhouse gas emissions and the provincial royalty scheme
were likely, but would be done in consultation with all stakeholders.49
Likewise, political winds swept through the Canadian federal government
during the October 2015 election. Liberal Party Leader Justin Trudeau
succeeded Conservative Party of Canada Prime Minister Stephen Harper
over thirty-five years after his father, Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s dynamic
legacy, which included the creation of a national energy company—Petro
Canada. In his first days in office, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau voiced
46. Brad Plumer, The Keystone XL Pipeline is Dead. Here’s Why Obama
Rejected It, VOX (Nov. 7, 2015), vox.com/2015/11/6/9681340/obama-rejectskeystone-pipeline [https://perma.cc/9YPH-SYGP].
47. Jesse Snyder, LNG Markets Could Return to Balance by 2021 and Spur
“Second Wave” of Opportunity: Analyst, FIN. POST (Oct. 4, 2016), business
.financialpost.com/news/energy/lng-markets-could-return-to-balance-by-2021-andspur-second-wave-of-opportunity-analyst?__lsa=1808-487b [https://perma.cc
/NRW7-2XB5].
48. Nick Wilson, How Rachel Notley is Shaking Up Alberta’s Energy Sector,
ALBERTA OIL (Feb. 6, 2017), albertaoilmagazine.com/2017/02/rachel-notley-shaking
-albertas-energy-sector/ [https://perma.cc/K758-PHPY].
49. Max Fawcett, Premier Notley Sends a Message to the Energy Sector,
ALBERTA OIL (July 8, 2015), albertaoilmagazine.com/2015/07/premier-notley-sendsa-message-to-the-energy-sector/ [https://perma.cc/XTD9-M2TZ].
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his support for environmental measures that move away from the use of
hydrocarbons. Most recently, Prime Minister Trudeau proposed a federal
carbon price, setting carbon pollution at $10 CAD per ton in 2018 and
rising annually to $50 CAD per ton in 2022.50 “Trudeau said his measures
would help Canada meet greenhouse gas emission cuts agreed under the
Paris climate change accords.”51 As a result, the conflation of these events
has resulted in great uncertainty in the Canadian energy sector.
III. CANADIAN STRATEGIES TO WEATHER THE DOWNTURN
Ultimately, Canada, like its southern neighbor, optimistically hopes
for an increase in hydrocarbon commodity prices. The most recent OPEC
meeting in September 2016 gave confidence to markets and producers
alike that supplies may ramp down in the near future. Otherwise, it is
relegated to reform and adapt, much as the industry did during the minidownturn in 2009. During this market decline, companies were
incentivized to economize shale well operations, learning to complete
hydraulic fracturing operations in less time and with fewer resources.
However, Canadian strengths include prolific, unconventional
reserves and a favorable currency hedge in that Canadian companies are
spending in the lower-valued Canadian dollar, but selling their
commodities in the higher U.S. dollar. This natural and protective hedge
has alleviated some of the pain associated with decreased commodity
prices.
Additionally, Canada possesses proven long-term assets such as the
Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin, the oil sands, and the offshore
Newfoundland assets of the Hibernia oilfield. Further, even though
economies have shrunk worldwide, Canada’s access to the Atlantic,
Pacific, and Arctic Oceans offer easy access for LNG transportation and
Arctic energy exploration once markets improve.
Strategies that Canada should employ include cutting costs;
considering foreign ownership (which may lead to divestiture during
downturns); and strategic M&A activity. Longer term, provincial and
federal governments should embrace the idea of energy realities, which do
not foreclose environmental protections or energy portfolio
diversification. Also, consideration should be given to the propriety of
foreign control of Canadian assets. Although foreign control indicates that
a nation operates within open markets—i.e., investments are controlled by
both domestic and foreign companies—and is supportive of “an efficient,
50. Alastair Sharp & David Ljunggren, Canada Unveils Carbon Price, EnergyProducing Provinces Unhappy, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2016), reuters.com/article/uscanada-carbon-idUSKCN12320O [https://perma.cc/7VVU-MZW8].
51. Id.
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competitive, and innovative energy system,”52 foreign controlled assets
are often subject to closer financial and prospective security in tightening
capital markets and during periods of decreased revenues.53
CONCLUSION
The uniqueness of a changed North American energy system means
that Canada, too, must adapt to the U.S.’s transformed role from energy
importer to swing supplier and energy exporter. The U.S. not only became
(for the most part) Canada’s “only customer,” but its number one
competitor.54 And the additional challenge of earthquakes arising from oil
and gas operations appears on the horizon. This challenge poses difficult
questions for stakeholders to answer given a relative lack of information
on underlying causes and whether oil and gas induced seismicity is
preventable without resorting to development prohibitions.55 In particular,
two such interesting questions include imposition of a liability regime and
security. Nevertheless, the timely expansion of Canada’s pipelines
network to deliver to more markets at home and abroad, along with the
development of liquefied natural gas export facilities remains a national
priority. Doing so would allow Canadians to earn full value for their
resources and create economic activity that would otherwise be lost.

52. See ENERGY FACT BOOK, supra note 16, at 11.
53. Id. (stating that “[g]enerally, a corporation is deemed to be foreign-controlled
if more than 50[%] of the shares are owned by one or more foreign companies.”).
54. Canadian Ass’n of Petroleum Producers Press Release, supra note 10.
55. For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see generally Paula E. Finely,
Bringing Down the House: The Regulation and Potential Liability of Induced
Earthquakes, 4 LSU J. OF ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 111 (2014); Monika Ehrman,
Earthquakes in the Oilpatch: The Regulatory and Legal Issues Arising Out of Induced
Seismicity in Oil and Gas Operations, 33 Ga. State L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming Spring
2017).

